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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I wish to present a syllogism. The major premise of 
the syllogism is that measure is a fantasy, as psychoanalysis defines the 
term. For the concept of measure I will take Hegel’s speculative theory 
from the Science of Logic.1 For the concept of fantasy, I will refer to 
various Lacanian texts. What is meant by fantasy is what metaphysi-
cians would call a totality. Therefore the argument from Hegel and La-
can is that measure presupposes an impossible totality. Nothing is 
measured unless everything is measured. Yet not everything can be 
measured! 
As the minor premise of the syllogism, I wish to show that money 
is a measure of value. For this proposition, I take Georg Simmel’s clas-
sic text The Philosophy of Money,2 a book that is “unfortunately ignored 
in the modern literature but full of relevant insights and anticipa-
tions[.]”3 
The consequent of the major and minor premises is that, to the ex-
tent that it is a measure, money is a fantasy. It relies on an impossible 
totality. As totality is what is required for the absolutely certain exist-
ence of a thing, the conclusion is that money does not exist, much as, 
 
 
∗  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
 1 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 327–32 (Arnold V. 
Miller trans., 1969) (1816). 
 2 GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (Tom Bottomore & David Frisby trans., 
1978). 
 3 Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommen-
surability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185, 1185 n.1 (1998). 
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for the Lacanians, Woman and God4 do not exist. Nevertheless, these 
things function powerfully in our fantasies. What more common things 
are there to fantasize about than money, women, and God? 
The implication of the syllogism is that money is “not all.” Money 
is feminine, quantitative, and hysterical.5 It does not exist for itself, but 
exists for its other—the subject. 
The subject that faces the totality of the money supply is masculine 
and qualitative. It “ex-sists.”6 That is, the masculine insists that it exist, 
unlike the feminine, which does not exist at all. Such a subject stands 
outside the totality that it fantasizes. The totality is taken as objective—
independent from the subject. For this reason, money—and economics 
in general—are not critical theories. A critical theory is one in which the 
theorist accounts for his own position.7 Economics cannot do this, how-
ever. Human subjectivity in economic theory is simply a dogmatic “giv-
en.” Economics cannot account for the structure and origin of human 
subjectivity. Basically, it can only deal with human beings as heterono-
mous animals—albeit animals that are capable of ends-means reason-
ing. 
Both the subject that values objects and the money that measures 
these aggregated values are contradictions in themselves. Each requires 
its other. Each is incompatible with its other. For this reason, money is a 
totality whose center cannot hold. Like all fantasies, it is perpetually at 
risk. It is like Neurath’s ship, constantly in need of repair, and which 
must be rebuilt again and again while the voyage continues.8 In the end, 
we cannot entirely say what money is. We can only point to it (osten-
sion),9 confident that it functions. 
 
 4 Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Does God Exist? Hegel and Things, 4 J. 
CULTURE & UNCONSCIOUS 1 (2005). This is definitely not an atheistic proposition. The point is 
that the realm of mere “existence”—the realm in which “things” seem to endure, for a time—are 
inadequate to Woman and God. 
 5 Hysterical in the Lacanian sense of “the desire of man is the desire of the Other.” Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Can Lawyers Be Cured?: Eternal Recurrence and the Lacanian Death Drive, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 960 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The point is that money is 
entirely the desire of its other and is nothing in and of itself. 
 6 See Renata Salecl, Rights in Psychoanalytic and Feminist Perspective, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1121, 1134 (1995) (“Lacan describes what he means by a matheme by invoking the differ-
ence between the meaning of the words ‘exist’ and ‘ex-sist’ (or insist). Something can exist only 
if it can be articulated in language. But what only ex-sit or insist (and belongs to the Real) cannot 
be described in language.”). 
 7 RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 55 (1981) (“Critical theo-
ries . . . [are] ‘self-referential’: a critical theory is itself always a part of the object-domain which 
it describes; critical theories are always in part about themselves.”). 
 8 WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 78–79 (1953) (“Yet we 
must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme that we 
grew up in. We can change it bit by bit, plank by plank, though meanwhile there is nothing to 
carry us along but the evolving conceptual scheme itself. The philosopher’s task was well com-
pared by Neurath to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea.”). 
 9 See id. at 67. 
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I.     FANTASY 
 
Fantasy is the construction any human subject builds up over the 
years according to which the subject has a fixed and certain existence. 
Why are human beings driven to construct the imaginary structure 
called fantasy? For human beings, nothing is self-authenticating. Every-
thing must be grounded in something else. “When we ask for a ground, 
we want to see the same determination that is content, double, once in 
the form of something posited”10—the explanation, and again in the 
form of the thing explained. The very structure of any explanation is 
that “it goes from the same to the same.”11 “[T]here is nothing in the 
ground that is not in the grounded, and there is nothing in the grounded 
that is not in the ground,”12 Hegel writes. 
So it is that upon being presented with an alien object, we must ask 
what it means. The traumatic new thing must be integrated into our 
preexisting structure of logic. From childhood, we slowly build a net-
work of meaning. By creating a network among objects, we fix our-
selves. “The reason why ‘explaining’ affords so much self-satisfaction,” 
Hegel writes, “is just because in it consciousness is . . . communing di-
rectly with itself . . . although it seems to be busy with something else, it 
is in fact occupied only with itself.”13 This network of explanation is 
what the Lacanians mean by “fantasy.” 
Of all the things that can come forward and disrupt our fantasy of 
certain existence within a fixed totality is our own self—that most alien 
and foreign of objects. The “self” is invisible to our senses. To be sure, 
we can sense our own body. No doubt the body is the condition for the 
possibility of the self.14 But our body does not make up the totality of 
ourselves. For one thing, it is said that the molecules that make up our 
body turn over and get replaced, so that, in a short period, even our 
bones have been entirely displaced. Whatever you are today, bodily, in, 
say, three years’ time, you will be entirely something other. Indeed, the 
self is nothing but the idea that connects today’s body with the body of 
ten years from now, with which it is chemically quite unconnected.15 
 
 10 HEGEL, supra note 1, at 457. 
 11 JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 133 
(1974). 
 12 HEGEL, supra note 1, at 457. 
 13 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 101 (A.V. Miller 
trans., 1977). 
 14 ANGELICA NUZZO, IDEAL EMBODIMENT: KANT’S THEORY OF SENSIBILITY 89 (2008) 
(“[A]s shown in the fourth Paralogism, the very possibility of distinguishing ‘my own existence 
as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me—among them my body’ is already pred-
icated upon my existence in a body and follows analytically from it.” (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, 
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON B409 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood trans., 1990))). 
 15 For Kant, time is the inner sense—pure intuition located in the subject and imposed by the 
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Lacanian fantasy as the network of explanation and meaning does 
not entirely comport with common use of the word “fantasy.” In fact, 
common use identifies two rather different meanings. First, fantasy is a 
daydream. In my daydream, I can fly and melt steel with my x-ray vi-
sion. But I can tell the difference between dream and reality. Second, it 
is also synonymous with delusion—a misinterpretation of reality. If in 
real life I try to fly, I will fall. In the common usage, fantasy is tolerable 
so long as I do not confuse fantasy with reality, in which case, fantasy is 
dangerous. 
Lacanian usage echoes at least some aspects of the two meanings 
assigned by common usage. Lacanians caution that fantasy is not to be 
confused with what is “real.” “Reality” in Lacanian thought (that is, 
“the Real”) is a forceful negativity that “fantasy” tries to contain. Reali-
ty is precisely what cannot be put into words. The Real is “the unfath-
omable limit that prevents the Particular from achieving identity with 
itself.”16 Any attempt to capture reality in words is doomed to fail be-
cause the Real is defined as the negation of the Symbolic. The Real 
transgresses the fantasy, and it is the role of fantasy to keep the Real at 
bay. “[F]antasy is essentially a lure that conceals the subject’s main-
spring, masking what truly makes the subject ‘tick[.]’”17 Fantasy is the 
realm in which the subject has a fixed existence—an immunity from the 
Lacanian Real. In contrast, the Real is obliterative. The Real erupts 
from within the subject himself, as subjects are the gap between the 
symbolic (law and language), the imaginary (fantasy), and the Real 
(jouissance, in which the subject “dies”). 
A fantasy is structured from intersubjective materials by the sub-
ject. Every subject that has not slipped back into psychosis has a fantasy 
that describes to the subject who he or she is, and how he or she relates 
to other things and other persons. Fantasy is the narrative in which the 
subject has positive existence for him or herself. It is for this reason that 
fantasy is on the side of man-on-the-street-style “reality” and against the 
horrific Real.18 
Fantasy represents the masculine position, meaning that fantasy is 
constructed by the subject from symbolic materials at hand. The fantasy 
reflects what the subject is (or is supposed to be) in the objective world. 
Take the Cartesian cogito ergo sum. The “I think” is active—the 
masculine pole of the subject. What it thinks—the “I am”—is the pas-
sive, feminine pole.19 
 
subject on the object world. See KANT, supra note 14, at A33/B49–50. 
 16 SLAVOJ ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL 
FACTOR 105 (1991). 
 17 BRUCE FINK, A CLINICAL INTRODUCTION TO LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS: THEORY AND 
TECHNIQUE 186-87 (1997). 
 18 See SLAVOJ ZIŽEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 43 (1989). 
 19 SLAVOJ ZIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF 
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In the masculine position, the active thinker fancies himself in 
complete control of passive being. This is the obsessional position that 
negates the Other.20 
Passive being is the symbolic realm of language and law. In this 
realm, the subject can find itself. The masculine pole therefore discov-
ers itself in the feminine pole. It constructs what it is, using the materi-
als found in the objective world of the Symbolic. So, subjectivity is a 
legal structure—a fantasy structure. It is law that constitutes the subject. 
The subject needs the law to recognize its own self. 
In this relationship to his fantasy, the masculine subject “has the 
Phallus”21—that is, he is uncastrated and assured of his existence. This, 
however, is a false claim.22 The phallus is “nothing but the symboliza-
tion of lack.”23 Thinking, however, is incompatible with what it thinks. 
What it thinks is the feminine—the phallus, which the masculine subject 
supposedly has.24 
None of this is to be conflated with biological sexuality. As Renata 
Salecl explains: 
Lacan thus moves as far as possible from the notion of sexual differ-
ence as the relationship of two opposite poles which complement 
each other, together forming the whole of “Man”. “Masculine” and 
“feminine” are not the two species of the genus Man but rather the 
two modes of the subject’s failure to achieve the full identity of Man. 
“Man” and “Woman” together do not form a whole, since each of 
them is already in itself a failed whole.25 
Fantasy as such, however, is a totality, where everything has mean-
ing or nothing has meaning. Fantasies are fixed. The problem is, how-
ever, that the Real forever intrudes upon fantasy. New things happen, 
moment by moment. When they happen, the fantasy must be patched up 
Neurath-style to account for the new phenomenon. 
Incidentally, Simmel, our theorist of money, sees this perfectly. 
According to Simmel, consciousness seeks satisfaction—fantasy! Sim-
mel writes, “Only when all the differences . . . are reconciled in a single 
 
IDEOLOGY 59–61 (1993); see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of 
Wealth Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687 [hereinafter, Schroeder, The Midas Touch]. 
 20 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147, 
249 (2000) (“The obsessional doesn’t try to reach the goal of desire (wholeness) because the mas-
culine subject tries to pretend that he is already whole.”). 
 21 JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND 
THE FEMININE 80, 87–94 (1998). 
 22 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Can Lawyers Be Cured? Eternal Recurrence and the Lacanian Death 
Drive, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 937-38 (2003); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A 
Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 507 (1998). 
 23 Schroeder, supra note 22, at 942. 
 24 See id. 
 25 RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE 
FALL OF SOCIALISM 116 (1994) (emphasis omitted). 
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aggregate is the intellectual and emotional striving for unity satisfied.”26 
Newness as such cannot be named. If a new thing could be named, 
it would not be new, but would already have been integrated into the 
fantasy. Rather, the new thing can be contained only by naming the 
things to which is related. There is no text in the class of the new. There 
is only context—the things surrounding the new which have already 
been interpreted. As a result, the new thing is a metonymy. That is to 
say, it is highly negative. It can only be integrated into its context. It can 
never be put into words directly. 
This portrait of fantasy comports with W.V.O. Quine’s definition 
of meaning: For Quine, the meaning of a sentence is the set of every 
synonymous sentence.27 But Quine would add this proviso: synonymy, 
one of the two dogmas of empiricism,28 is impossible. 
This adds up to the fact that “things” are metonymies. If synonymy 
always fails, the new thing can never be named. We can only name the 
context of the new thing. We can never reduce a thing to its criteria. 
Although we fantasize that we can define what a thing is (by giving a 
complete account of its criteria), ultimately there is an irreducible mo-
ment of “pointing” at the nonlinguistic thing.29 This nonlinguistic irre-
ducible thing at which we can only point is the Lacanian real that cannot 
be reduced to words. 
 
II.     MEASURE 
 
Hegel presents a full-dress theory of measure in the Science of 
Logic. The upshot of Hegel’s analysis is that measure of any one thing 
implies the present measure of all things. But even when every measure 
is deemed present, the Lacanian Real still disrupts it. Hegel calls the 
measureless unnamable thing “Essence.”30 
Measure is the final part of Hegel’s theory of being. Generally, 
measure stands for the realm of appearance, which cannot sustain itself 
without a subject to which it appears. This subject “transcends” the 
realm of measure, in the sense that the subject is defined as being be-
 
 26 SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 110. 
 27 W.V. QUINE, THEORIES AND THINGS 46 (1981). 
 28 See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: NINE LOGICO-
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 22–26, 36 (1953) (“[T]ruth in general depends on both language and 
extralinguistic fact.”). 
 29 See Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning,” in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 
215, 231–35 (Hilary Putnam ed., 2d ed. 1979). 
 30 HEGEL, supra note 1, at 379 (“[Measure] therefore has to be posited as sublating this its 
contradictory nature and acquiring the character of a self-determined, self-subsistent being which 
has for its result and truth not the unity which is merely indifferent, but that immanently negative 
and absolute unity which is called essence.”). 
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yond measure—the immeasurable. I proffer this with full appreciation 
of the fact that, in the end, Hegel is a rigorous anti-transcendental phi-
losopher who specifically and repeatedly attacked Kant’s notion of the 
thing in itself—the noumenon beyond the realm of phenomenalistic ap-
pearance.31 Measure is, as it were, the realm of Kantian appearance, 
with its notorious thing in itself.32 
Formally, measure is the unity of quality and quantity—the two 
categories that precede it. This is a definition that Simmel emphasized: 
A measuring instrument, it is said, has to have the same quality as 
the object to be measured: a measure of length has to be long, a 
measure of weight has to be heavy, a measure of space has to have 
dimensions; consequently, a measure of value has to be valuable. No 
matter how unrelated two things may be in all other respects, when I 
measure them against each other they must both have the quality that 
I am comparing. Any quantitative and numerical equality or inequali-
ty that I assert would be meaningless if it did not refer to the relative 
quantities of one and the same quality.33 
So, for example, if I compare a yardstick to a human being who is 
standing up, both the yardstick and the human have the quality of 
“height.” The ratio of the yardstick to the human is one unit of “height” 
to roughly two units of “height.” 
To understand measure fully, we must also comprehend the con-
stituent parts of quality and quantity. Needless to say, I can only give 
the briefest tour of the earlier portions of the Science of Logic, but this 
can indeed be done precisely. 
Quality is that which resists otherness. It is being-for-self or free-
dom. But without an Other, quality can say nothing as to what it is. It is 
merely negative freedom. It therefore collapses and confesses that is 
nothing but otherness.34 As such it is quantity. 
As for quantity, few before or after Hegel have bothered to define 
what we mean by the word. Most people would say quantity is a num-
ber. But that is just an example—and an advanced concrete example at 
that. “Number” is actually an impure quantity, with aspects of quality 
 
 31 ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL’S IDEALISM: THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
211 (1989) (“[T]here are no ‘essences’ beyond or behind the appearances, at least none that can 
do any cognitive work. There are just the appearances . . . .”). 
 32 One finds at the beginning of the “Measure” section an analysis of Kant’s category of 
mode, which Hegel alleges is the true “third” category to Kant’s previous categories of quantity 
and quality. See HEGEL, supra note 1, at 327–29. Hegel’s identification of modality as a form of 
measure constitutes “the essence of Hegel’s response to the challenge of the way in which tran-
scendental idealism treated determinate being.” Cinzia Ferrini, On the Relation Between “Mode” 
and “Measure” in Hegel’s Science of Logic: Some Introductory Remarks, 20 OWL OF MINERVA 
21, 47–48 (1988). 
 33 SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 131. 
 34 HEGEL, supra note 1, 185 (explaining that being-for-self becomes “absolutely identical 
with being-for-other”). 
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mixed in. Thus, number is continuity with otherness (quantity), but also 
number is a unit (discontinuity with otherness).35 
Hegel insisted that beneath number was a substrate of “pure quan-
tity.” This, Hegel defined as absolute openness to outside determina-
tion—”indifferen[ce] to its affirmative determinateness.”36 Quantity is 
promiscuous. It is whatever the outside mathematician wants it to be. 
The mathematician carves up this blob called quantity—what Cantor 
would have called the continuum37—into numbers, or units that contin-
ue into other units and therefore have “amount.” Indeed, set theory 
speaks of “Dedekind cuts,” wherein the real number line is literally 
“sliced” into two disjoint sets, each of which is sliced again, as often as 
the mathematician chooses.38 
Based on this definition, one can see in advance that money is a 
quantity, because the community can set a monetary value on all things. 
Money is open to any imposition on it that the public may, in the aggre-
gate, choose. Money is not, however, a pure quantity once it is divided 
into units—a qualitative intervention. 
Once a mathematician decides to slice the continuum into units, the 
imposition of a successor function39 gives numbers some considerable 
rigor, so that it becomes impossible to derive five from the addition of 
2 + 2. In the number line, every unit can be assigned a name—e.g., one, 
four or nine.40 But there are two numbers that the mathematician cannot 
name: the infinitely largest or smallest numbers. Any nomination for 
this honor by a mathematician may be bettered if we simply take the 
nominated largest number and multiply by two. Similarly, we cannot 
name the infinitely smallest number, known to Leibnizian calculus as 
δx. Again, any nomination for smallest number can be defeated by di-
viding the nominated number by two. 
 
 35 See id. at 202–04. 
 36 Id. at 372. 
 37 See generally MARY TILES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SET THEORY: AN HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO CANTOR’S PARADISE (1989) (explaining that a continuum forms a whole be-
cause it is homogeneous and not differentiated into parts). 
 38 See id. at 86. Formally, a Dedekind cut in P is a pair (A, B) of disjoint nonempty subsets of 
P such that 
(i) A ∪ B = P 
(ii) a < b for any a ∈ B and b ∈ B. 
(iii) A does not have a greatest element. 
THOMAS JECH, SET THEORY 39 (3d ed. 2000). 
 39 In set theory terms, x ∪ {x}. Id. at 12. 
 40 Actually, even whole numbers can’t properly be named. As Hegel knew, 1/(1-a) can be 
expressed as 1 + a + a2 + a3 etc . . . This, however, is true only if a < 1. HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE 
OF LOGIC, supra note 1, at 246-47. More generally, if ⏐r⏐ < 1, the geometric series 
a + ar + ar2 . . . arn-1 . . . . 
converges to a sum a/(1-r). But it never quite reaches this sum. 
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This inability to name the vanishing quantum δx is the quality of 
the quantum. So quantity—absolute promiscuity to outside determina-
tion—has a quality. Quality cannot be quantified. And so quality in the 
end stands for that which cannot be named by the other—by the math-
ematician.41 Unnameability is what quality—resistance to otherness—
has become. Meanwhile, quantity continues to stand for openness and 
indifference to outside determination. Yet, quantities are also qualities 
that resist outside manipulation. 
Measure is the unity of quality and quantity. At first, measure is 
brittle. A slight quantitative change, imposed upon quality by another, 
constitutes a qualitative change. But the logic of quality is that it sur-
vives quantitative change—even while it is what it is by virtue of its 
unique quantity. After all, quality is that which cannot be precisely 
quantified. On the other hand, qualitative change is achieved by quanti-
tative change. As Hegel writes: 
[D]oes the pulling out of a single hair from the head . . . produce 
baldness, or does a heap cease to be a heap if a grain is removed? An 
answer in the negative can be given without hesitation since such a 
removal constitutes only a quantitative difference, a difference 
moreover which is itself quite insignificant; thus a hair, a grain, is 
removed and this is repeated, only one of them being removed each 
time in accordance with the answer given. At last the qualitative 
change is revealed; the head . . . is bald, the heap has disappeared. In 
giving the said answer, what was forgotten was not only the repeti-
tion, but the fact that the individually insignificant quantities (like the 
individually insignificant disbursements from a fortune) add up and 
the total constitutes the qualitative whole, so that finally this whole 
has vanished; the head is bald, the purse is empty.42 
This example indicates that a quality has immunity from change 
with its range, but it also has a “beyond,” which is quantitatively 
brought about. Quantitative change is imposed from without, and even-
tually it will spell the doom of a quality. 
Within this range, a measure is authentic. It reveals a quantum that 
is authentic to the quality of a thing. But a measure is not self-
authenticating. It needs another measure to reveal what it is. As John 
Burbidge remarks: 
Measuring . . . introduces an explicit act of relating, for it brings to-
gether two realities, indifferent to each other. This conjunction is 
recognized as valid, however, only if each term allows for, and in-
deed encourages, the association. Since mutual reference is now an 
inherent characteristic of the concept, one passes beyond simple im-
 
 41 Although δx or δy cannot be named, the ratio δx/δy can be precisely determined. 
 42 HEGEL, supra note 1, at 335. 
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mediacy.43 
One example is measuring the temperature of a baby by use of a 
thermometer.44 The baby is indifferent to having its temperature taken 
and the thermometer is what it is whether it measures the baby, a cup of 
tea, or the ambient air. An outside measurer brings these two measures 
together. Now one of these things is the specifying measure, which uses 
its other to advertise its quantum. The other is the specified measure that 
serves to report what the specifying measure advertises. But which is 
which? This is entirely up to the measurer. Commonly, the baby is the 
specifying measure. But in principle there is no reason why babies 
could not be used to measure thermometers. This is a matter for the will 
of the measurer. 
Simmel is percipient on this point. “[T]he disproportion of weights 
caused us, for a long time, to notice the gravitational attraction of the 
earth upon the apple but not that of the apple upon the earth[,]” he 
writes.45 In fact, the apple attracts the earth and the earth attracts the ap-
ple. That the apple “falls” to the earth is simply the common bias of the 
observer. The earth equally falls up toward the apple. 
What both the baby and the apple examples show is that the quan-
tum that gets reported in measure is actually not the quantum of either 
measure in the ratio but some third thing. So when the measurer takes 
the baby’s temperature, he does not learn directly what the baby’s tem-
perature is. Rather, he learns what the ratio of mercury thermometer to 
baby is. If the measurer really wants to know what the baby’s tempera-
ture is, she will have to test the baby against an alcohol thermometer, a 
thermometer containing single malt scotch, a thermometer containing 
seawater, etc. . . . The baby’s true quantum is only revealed in an infi-
nite sequence of measures, which Hegel calls the “elective affinities.”46 
In an important sense, the ratio of baby-to-thermometer or apple-
to-earth is misleading. Babies and apples are things. A “thing” is logi-
cally too sophisticated for the precise point of the Science of Logic that 
considers the nature of measure. “Things” do not appear until the mid-
dle portion of Essence, which is the beyond of Measure.47 What in fact 
we are measuring is the totality of quantities and qualities. Each quality 
is a range across which the quality is independent from outside manipu-
lation by the measure. To measure the totality we must make present all 
the quantities and qualities, expressed as ratios with all the other quanti-
 
 43 JOHN W. BURBIDGE, ON HEGEL’S LOGIC: FRAGMENTS OF A COMMENTARY 63 (1981). 
 44 See David Gray Carlson, Hegel’s Theory of Measure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 129, 149–50 
(2003). 
 45 SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 116 
 46 HEGEL, supra note 1, at 354–56. 
 47 The “thing” emerges from its ground in Hegel’s thirteenth chapter of Science of Logic. Id. 
at 481–96. 
Carlson.33-6.doc (Do Not Delete) 8/27/12 7:12 PM 
2012] M O NEY AS  M EASU RE  2541 
ties and qualities. Unless everything is present all at once, nothing is 
truly measured. 
Hegel develops measure into a fantasy in his chapter, “The Becom-
ing of Essence.”48 At this point, every measure is deemed to be present. 
Of course, this is an empirical impossibility. Nevertheless, as a thought 
experiment, we are bidden to imagine this as a recursive definitional 
matter. Nevertheless, measure fails as a totality. There is a non-presence 
that organizes the realm of measure that disrupts the fantasy, which He-
gel at first calls “the Measureless,”49 but later renames “Essence.”50 Es-
sence for Hegel is very, very negative. It is simply that which is not. In 
effect, Essence is the Lacanian Real that disrupts the fantasy of meas-
ure. 
I conclude with a caveat about engineering. Engineering tolerates 
imprecision in measurement. It is possible in this world to be a success-
ful engineer. But Hegel is not concerned with engineering. He is con-
cerned with the logic of totality. Empirically, it is quite impossible to 
measure everything. Hegel’s point is that, even if we could, there would 
be a disruptive beyond to measure. Ultimately, nothing is measured ap-
odictically unless everything is measured. The fantasy of measure, how-
ever, fails as a logical matter. The totality cannot be measured. 
 
III.     MONEY 
 
The conclusion of the syllogism is that money is a fantasy, as illus-
trated by Georg Simmel’s classic text, The Philosophy of Money,51 first 
published in 1907. Simmel was a sociologist at the University of Berlin 
whose approach was highly Kantian. Simmel’s approach to money far 
transcended the ordinary realm of markets, with which economics is 
largely concerned. According to Simmel, “[t]he significance and pur-
pose of the whole undertaking is simply to derive from the surface level 
of economic affairs a guideline that leads to the ultimate values and 
things of importance in all that is human.”52 Simmel’s task is one of phi-
losophy, “whose problem is nothing less than the totality of being.”53 In 
short, Simmel is a philosopher of the totality of money. 
Simmel states the obvious: the value of objects cannot be inferred 
 
 48 Id. at 375–85. I analyze this chapter in David Gray Carlson, Hegel and the Becoming of 
Essence, in THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE: HEGEL AND THE FATE OF THINKING 118 (2008) (Paul Ash-
ton et al. eds., 2008). 
 49 HEGEL, supra note 1, at 371–74. 
 50 Id. at 385. 
 51 SIMMEL, supra note 2. 
 52 Id. at 55. 
 53 Id. at 56. 
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from “reality.”54 “[V]alue is never a ‘quality’ of the objects, but a judg-
ment upon them which remains inherent in the subject.”55 Value comes 
from human subjects. 
Simmel’s logic very much follows that of Hegel with regard to 
measure. Thus, an object’s value does not reside in the relation of the 
object to the subject: “the mere demand for an object does not yet create 
an economic value, because it does not include the required measure.”56 
Rather, value puts one object in relation to another object. A cabbage 
has value only in comparison to a quantity of carrots. “[T]here is a re-
ciprocal determination of value by the objects. By being exchanged, 
each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value 
through the other object.”57 
Because all subjects contribute to valuation, economic value 
achieves a sort of conventional objectivity—an inter-subjectivity that 
transcends any one subject’s desire. Thus, “value becomes supra-
subjective, supra-individual, yet without becoming an objective quality 
and reality of the things themselves. . . . The technical form of economic 
transactions produces a realm of values that is more or less completely 
detached from the subjective-personal substructure.”58 
True, an individual buys because he values. But his demand is ex-
pressed in the object of exchange. “The fact of economic exchange, 
therefore, frees the objects from their bondage to the mere subjectivity 
of the subjects.”59 But, reciprocally, exchange frees the subject from the 
objects of his property. In market exchange, the subject shows that he 
transcends his property and can do, in general, without them.60 
Simmel emphasizes many times that money is a measure of val-
ue.61 To be sure, the money supply may be enhanced, in which case 
more money is chasing the same amount of goods, thereby causing 
prices to fall.62 Nevertheless, at “equilibrium”—i.e., the fantastical mas-
culine universe in which all movement (that is, time and space) is 
wished away63—money is a measure that is based on the fantasy of to-
tality. In this fantasy, a unit of money expresses the entire universe of 
 
 54 See id. at 59. 
 55 Id. at 63. 
 56 Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
 57 Id. at 78. 
 58 Id. at 78–79. 
 59 Id. at 80. 
 60 See id. at 120 (“The money price of a commodity indicates the degree of exchangeability 
between the commodity and the aggregate of all other commodities.”). 
 61 See, e.g., id. at 78–79, 92, 122, 131, 190, 431 (“[M]oney measures all objects with merci-
less objectivity. . . .”); id. at 511. 
 62 See id. at 133. 
 63 An economic equilibrium is a perfect market. “The perfect market is an impossible realm 
without any distinctions of time, space, subjectivity, objectivity—indeed, of no market exchange 
at all.” Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra note 19, at 693. 
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commodities. Thus, a dollar is a small portion of a trip to Europe, of a 
dental examination, or of a diamond necklace. All objects that can be 
sold are expressed in this dollar. All commodities are present in every 
single monetary unit.64 
This leads Simmel to suggest, at times, that the money supply is 
precisely equal in size to the value of all commodities.65 True, Simmel 
views this as “a preliminary, crude and schematic step,”66 but he is 
forced to admit that, if everyone brought every nonmonetary thing he or 
she owned to the market place at once, then the value of a dollar would 
rise. 
Simmel considers the problem of 
those objects that are not offered for sale, but are occasionally salea-
ble if there is a tempting offer. If the amount of money required for 
the sale of the total supply of goods were calculated on the basis of 
the prices actually paid for these goods, the estimate would vastly 
exceed the actual supply of money. From this point of view, it can be 
stated that there is much less money than commodities and that the 
proportion between the commodity and its price is not at all equal to 
the proportion between all commodities and all money, but is con-
siderably smaller than this.67 
Simmel’s appreciation of this problem reminds me of a remarkable 
talk given to the Cardozo Law School faculty by the son of a Nobel 
Prize winning economist who wished to get into the family business. 
The proposition of the talk was that murder can be efficient. I have no 
doubt this is true, as witnessed by the executioner’s song in The Mikado 
and the common daydream of going back in time to murder Hitler. But 
measure is the obvious problem in this theory of efficient murder. The 
speaker proposed a Posnerian auction68 in which everyone presently in 
the world69 would bid on whether a given person should live or die. It 
was pointed out in the question period that in order to participate in this 
life-or-death auction, everyone would rush all his or her commodities to 
the market in order to liquefy because liquefaction was the sine qua non 
for participation in this democratic Totentanz. But upon arriving at the 
market, there would be no one to offer dollars for these commodities, 
 
 64 See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'Y 85, 87 (1985) (“When I used money as a component of wealth . . . it was just a short-
hand for the things that money can buy.”). 
 65 See SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 133; cf. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and 
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) (“Wealth is the value in dollars or dollar equiva-
lents . . . in society. It is measured by what people are willing to pay for something or, if they al-
ready own it, what they demand in money to give it up.”). 
 66 SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 134. 
 67 Id. at 138. 
 68 E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 243, 246–47 (1980). 
 69 Presumably, the dead and the unborn have nothing to say on this or any issue. 
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because to buy a commodity was to surrender liquidity, the very thing 
required to participate in the auction.70 The speaker rescued his theory 
of efficient murder by conceding that one would have to imagine an 
“imaginary” market in which each owner of a commodity would cash 
out her commodities in an orderly fashion so that there could be a true 
measure of the person’s wealth. 
This tactic is not dissimilar to that of Simmel. In effect, Simmel 
redefines commodities to only those commodities, which at a precise 
moment in time, are actually sold. All the commodities back in the 
warehouse that could have been sold are not truly commodities at all: 
However, there are two ways in which we can save our basic propo-
sition. First, we might regard as the total quantity of commodities, 
that quantity that is actually in the process of being sold. To use an 
Aristotelian concept: the unsold commodity is merely a possible 
commodity, which becomes a real commodity only at the moment of 
sale. Just as money is real money only at the moment when it buys 
something, i.e. when it exercises the function of money, so the com-
modity becomes a commodity only when it is sold; until that time, it 
is only a possible object for sale, an ideal anticipation. From this 
standpoint, it is an obvious and analytical statement that there is as 
much money as there are objects to be sold—including as money, of 
course, all those money substitutes provided by the banking and 
credit system.71 
Simmel then defines commodities as that which are actually sold at 
the precise moment they are sold. Commodities in the warehouse and 
not in the market are not actual commodities. They are only potential 
commodities. Similarly, money is money only when used in exchange. 
Money buried in the backyard or in the money market is not money.72 
These savings and deferred consumptions are merely potential money. 
In short, for Simmel, there is no money and no commodities out-
side exchange. Here, we see fantasy reduced to its fundamental essence: 
fantasy is a philosophy of presence;73 and so is Simmel’s vision of mon-
ey: either everything is exchanged for money all at once now, or the en-
tire concept falls apart. 
But aside from this point, it is clear that there is no one “money” 
that expresses the value of all commodities. “The ideal purpose of mon-
ey, as well as of the law, is to be a measure of things without being 
 
 70 Schroeder, The Midas Touch, supra note 19, at 712 (“A perfect monetization of goods, 
therefore, would have the lethal effect of the Midas touch. At the moment of wealth maximiza-
tion, all actual market exchanges would cease and all wealth would evaporate.”). 
 71 SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 138. 
 72 See SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 127, 510. 
 73 See David Gray Carlson, On the Margins of Microeconomics, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867 
(1993), reprinted in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 265, 266–67 (Drucilla 
Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
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measured itself, a purpose that can be realized fully only by an endless 
development.”74 In fact, against its will, money is constantly becoming 
a commodity. To be sure, Simmel much emphasizes the historical origin 
of money as the most common and universal of commodities. But even-
tually (so Simmel asserts) money ceases to be a commodity, and indeed 
must do so if it is to be money. That is, money is a measure of the value 
of commodities and so cannot itself be a commodity. Simmel was ahead 
of his day in seeing that money has nothing to do with, say, gold or sil-
ver, and that money could (and indeed must) be reduced to a neutral, 
abstract measure.75 In fact, when gold or silver (in the old days) is used 
in jewelry, Simmel insists that the metal ceases being money and be-
comes a commodity. 
But in fact, money can never stay withdrawn from the world of 
commodities. Money is not just dollars. The dollar itself becomes a 
commodity in foreign exchange. When a dollar is traded for a euro, it is 
entirely unclear which is the commodity and which is the measure of 
the commodity. The same point can be made about loans. As Simmel 
emphasizes, potential money (that is, future money) is not the same as 
present money. So in a loan, future dollars are purchased for present 
dollars. It is perhaps easy to say that the present dollar is the neutral 
measure, and the future dollar is the commodity. But tomorrow’s dollar 
will eventually become the present, neutral measure. Future dollars can-
not help but surrender their status as commodities in order to become 
the neutral measure. 
To summarize, then, it is impossible to say exactly what money is. 
It purports to measure commodities, but this is so only if we exclude the 
commodities not “presently” being exchanged. It purports to be un-
commodified, but, given multiple monetary systems and the concept of 
future money, money is always constantly becoming a commodity. 
Money therefore does not have a fixed existence, which makes it a fem-
inine concept, like Woman and God. That we can theorize money is 
precisely the obsessional masculine fantasy. 
The lesson, however, is not that we should give up on theory—of 
money or any other totality. Rather, the lesson is that theory is neces-
sarily a dialectic process that is constantly on the move. Theory is a 
 
 74 SIMMEL, supra note 2, at 511. How is money like law? Simmel has in mind the essence or 
paradigm of a thing: 
Just as the general concept in its logical validity is independent of the number and 
modification of its realizations, indicating, as it were, their lawfulness, so too money—
that is, the inner rationale by which the single piece of metal or paper becomes mon-
ey—is the general concept of objects in so far as they are economic. They do not need 
to be economic; but if they wish to be, they can do so only by adjusting to the law of 
valuation that is embodied in money. 
Id. 
 75 See id. at 191. 
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necessary but inadequate component in human experience.76 Theorizing 
is precisely how human beings create for themselves a world in which 
they themselves have a place and a home. Theorizing about money is as 
much about who we are as it is about what money is. 
 
 
 
 76 This is largely the theme of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. As Nuzzo writes, reflective 
judgment is where 
[w]e begin to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of nature, which is thereby progressively 
transformed into a systematic whole. The important point in this reflective operation is 
that we become [an] integral part of nature. Reflection reconciles us with the object we 
are judging and unifies us with it; our experience of the object is an experience of our-
selves. 
NUZZO, supra note 14, at 242. 
